Checker Shadow Illusion

Checker Shadow Illusion

Two checkerboard squares look clearly dark and light, yet they're the exact same gray. Your brain's correction for a shadow fools you completely.

Look at the two squares marked A and B below. One is obviously dark and the other obviously light. Except they aren't: they're exactly the same shade of gray. The Checker Shadow Illusion shows how strongly the context around a color changes the way you see it. Checker Shadow IllusionWikipedia - The squares marked A and B are the same shade of gray

Here's what's happening. The image is a checkerboard of alternating light and dark squares, with a cylinder casting a shadow across part of it. Squares in the shadow reflect less light, so on the page they're physically darker than their counterparts in the open.

Square A is a dark square sitting in the light. Square B is a light square sitting in the shadow. The shadow has darkened B until it's exactly the same gray as A. But your brain knows about shadows. It sees the shadow and the checkerboard pattern, corrects for them, and tells you B is "really" a light square and A is "really" a dark one. So A looks darker and B looks lighter, even though the ink is identical.

That correction is usually helpful: it's how you recognize a white shirt as white whether you're in sunlight or shade. But it also means what you see isn't a direct readout of the physical world. It's your brain's best guess about it. Your ears get the same treatment: in the McGurk effect, what you see changes what you hear.

Two squares on a checkerboard, one plainly dark and one plainly light, turn out to be exactly the same shade of gray. That's the Checker Shadow Illusion, created by Edward H. Adelson, a Professor of Vision Science at MIT, and it's one of the cleanest demonstrations of how much interpretation goes into "just seeing." It shows simultaneous contrast at work: the brightness or color we perceive in a surface depends heavily on what surrounds it.

The two squares look different because the visual system doesn't read them in isolation. It takes in the whole scene, including the checkerboard pattern and the shadow cast by a cylinder, and adjusts its verdict accordingly.

Several principles help explain what's going on:

  1. Lateral inhibitionIn this neurophysiological process, a neuron's activity is dampened by the activity of its neighbors, which sharpens contrast at the boundaries between light and dark areas. It's part of how the retina processes visual information, and it contributes to the illusion. It's also the classic explanation for the Hermann grid illusion.

  2. Color constancyOur visual system tries to keep an object's color looking stable even when the lighting changes. Here, it compensates for the shadow, and that very correction is what makes us misjudge the squares.

  3. Gestalt psychologyThis school of thought stresses that perception works on wholes. The visual system organizes sensory input into coherent patterns, so it treats the shadow and the checkerboard as meaningful context and adjusts how the squares appear.

  4. Bayesian inferenceIn statistics, this is a way of updating beliefs in light of new evidence. The visual system can be seen as doing something similar, combining prior knowledge about the world (for example, how shadows and checkerboards usually look) with incoming sensory data to build what we experience. In this case, that sensible strategy produces the wrong answer about the squares' colors.

References

  • Adelson, E. H. (1995). Checkershadow Illusion. Retrieved from http://persci.mit.edu/gallery/checkershadow
  • Purves, D., Shimpi, A., & Lotto, R. B. (1999). An empirical explanation of the Cornsweet effect. Journal of Neuroscience, 19(19), 8542-8551.
  • Brainard, D. H., & Radonjić, A. (2014). Color constancy. In The New Visual Neurosciences (pp. 545-556). MIT Press.
  • Wagemans, J., Elder, J. H., Kubovy, M., Palmer, S. E., Peterson, M. A., Singh, M., & von der Heydt, R. (2012). A century of Gestalt psychology in visual perception: I. Perceptual grouping and figure-ground organization. Psychological Bulletin, 138(6), 1172-1217.
  • Knill, D. C., & Richards, W. (Eds.). (1996). Perception as Bayesian Inference. Cambridge University Press.